VIDEOS: Battle Inoculation: CQB & CASEVAC
In my previous post ‘Mental Preparation for Combat’ I stress the need to training and mental preparation for combat. When I teach combat lifesaver (TC3) I stress how hard it is to evacuate a casualty. Today I am going to post some video clips from YouTube that I hope will help make this point.
The essential need for:
Effective Training, including: Battle Inoculation & Stress training
Physical & Mental Preparation
These videos are from Helmand Province, a place where I spent a couple of years. The place varies from wide open flat or mountainous desert, to close country in the’green zone’ around the Helmand river. The former lends itself to mobility operations and long range engagements. The later is a night mare of compounds, irrigation ditches, crop fields and vegetation. Hence ‘green zone.’
I’m going to put a couple of intro videos up and then get to the heart of the matter with the third video:
1) Despite the advertising, this is not the SAS. It’s a unit of British Infantry. The video gives you an idea of a close engagement in the green zone. Taliban in the ditch. Its nit high quality, but at the end you see the dead enemy in the water.
(Note: The clip above is of the Platoon Sergeant in the third clip below. It shows it towards the end).
2) This is a short video showing how quickly it can happen. Shot to the face. I don’t know the back story, it could be a ricochet or even a bit of rock that hit him. I think that towards the end of the video, after the initial shock, he realizes that he is not that badly wounded, and gets back on the gun:
3) This last video is the nub of it. It’s a long one. There is nothing cool about this video. It is raw footage of a raw unit of British Infantry coming under fire in close country, taking casualties, and trying to evacuate them. Note the Platoon Sergeant yelling himself raw trying to motivate the young soldiers, who are acting as if in a daze. Don’t armchair quarterback it – instead, ask if you and your small team would do any better? Perhaps worse?
Chaos & Tragedy.
Watch at least from 19:00 where the action starts through to 60:00 which includes some lessons learned:
TRAIN.
Realistic Training!
Live Hard.
Die Free.
Max
For brutality and it’s sake that video of al qjeda thugs in Iraq takes first prize
Total TCCC fail in #2, drop your weapon attend to the wounded and leave the most casualty producing weapon out of the fight WHILE rounds are still coming in. Of course I’m arm chairing this but its an important take away, especially when his wounds appear superficial
It takes a hard heart to climb over your buddy and start working his gun without knowing if he’s dead or dying. That’s what we strive for but everyone is human and this was their first contact. Let’s not be too harsh on these men. They all did an outstanding job and the mistakes and accompanying AARs are what make professionals better.
One thing that is missing regarding Battle Inoculation – the further into a tour and the more patrols that you go on, which for frontline British troops is virtually every single day, is the progession from early tour alertness followed by complacency, and ending with total mental acceptance resulting in an attitude of no longer giving a toss where you put your feet (ie the belief that your luck is eventualy going to run out so if you are going to step on something, hope and pray it takes you out instantly).
Too much inoculation without rest periods can have a far worsening effects on operational capabilities than actual enemy engagements.
I can see this area being a serious operational issue that can seriously hamper militia operations as the Government Twats will have an almost endless supply of resources and will be able to ensure their Twats are rested.
Militia won’t have that luxury.
I see your point…
as far as supplies, resources, etc. But I also know from numerous accounts I have read, (never been there, so maybe I am talking out of my ass. If so, bear with me) that there were times when a rag tag bunch of guys running around in man dresses carrying a rifle, a couple of mags, and some flat bread wore out the allied units, and in some cases handed them their asses. I think that is why the surge happened in 08 or whenever it was.
I can’t say for sure, but I believe the majority of people a well ordered militia would face in any such conflict may not carry the conviction that the militia will. They will most likely come in over confident, and rely on their superior technology to wow militia forces into throwing in the towel.
A lot depends on leadership of course, but for those who will fight, I think the mindset of defending your home turf probably galvanizes the will like nothing else can. At least I hope so.
Where “over-innoculation” is concerned, whatever missions are run by militia units will have to be well planned, and well thought out. They will have to be chosen carefully for greatest impact, and best chance of success. And they will have to be rehearsed to perfection by well trained men.
As far as the mistakes made in the battle conveyed in the video, I want to preface this by saying I have no clue how I would have handled it given the same set of circumstances. I have some ideas, but as Mike Tyson said:” Everybody has a plan til they get punched in the mouth.” So this is not throwing rocks, but, it would have been nice if they had been able to sustain over-watch from a UAV or a gunship of some sort. Hell, had they even committed another squad, even a 4 man team (sniper, and three riflemen, or a sniper, an LMG, and a couple of rifles on a rooftop.) The “chance encounter,” just walking along and bumping into the enemy was poor planning, and shit recon from my armchair general’s position, and ultimately is what got that kid killed.
‘G’s’ would most likely look at an operation roughly every thirty days, taking into account planning, movement, op, recovery, rest, administration. Unless pressed hard on the defensive of course.
‘Over inoculation’ as SP says (good to see you again SP!) is a real problem. I call it complacency, but it is to do with fatigue, lack of rest, fatalism etc.
Complacency kills, and it takes a lot of motivation to defy it. All will suffer from it to some extent – when your operations become ‘routine’ and you start taking shortcuts and not giving a fuck.
remember that after the first few engagements the summer soldiers will be weeded out and the remainder will be fighting for their homeland and way of life as well as their brothers at arms and the very survival of their families. complacency will therefore be more of an issue for regime forces than patriots. that said, patriots won’t likely be able to rotate to the world for a year either so battle fatigue kicks in. these can be managed by good nco’s to a degree. picking small winnable battles and avoiding regime firepower can help build/maintain morale. we don’t have to win, just never be seen as losing.
Hmm, I can see the possibility of another blog discussion:
“How to maintain operational effectiveness without compromising manpower and moral”