Video: Real Combat: Colombian Troops Wiped Out
This is an interesting video because we can draw some rapid lessons learned from it. I have only scanned this once, this is no deep analysis. The relevant part starts at around 14:00 minutes.
Rapid takeaways:
1) The troops displayed no aggressiveness, or small unit tactics. They hardly returned fire at all, or coordinated any movement. Poor training.
2) The troops were focused on reinforcement and evacuation using air assets. When you are on the ground you have to act, as if you are on your own. They were on their own when they were killed, and as a survivalist you will not have any air assets.
3) They also focused on fire support generated from air assets (again you won’t have this). This was ineffective, particularly in the jungle terrain (canopy. vegetation etc). The chain guns were unable to effect the maneuver of the FARC guerrillas.
4) They stayed put, split between the village and the hill. Cover is only temporary. At class, how many times do I tell you that if you stay put, the enemy will maneuver on you? This is exactly what happened. They would have been better off running some break contact drills and fighting away to consolidate in a better position for extraction.
5) The FARC guerrillas closed on the government forces using maneuver and the flanks. See CUTT Operations HERE. They closed with the government troops, after fixing them in position. Once they were close, they no longer had to worry about the air assets, it was all danger close at that point.
6) If you can throw a grenade at the enemy, they can throw one back at you! Be in cover!
7) If you are conducting security force operations in an area of overwhelming enemy superiority, you need to make it short and sharp and patrol off so they cannot get a fix on your location. If they do locate you, you need to move aggressively to another location and try to break the envelopment. If you cannot withdraw, then at least take the fight to the enemy and try to fight out.
8) Reliance on air assets and ‘call for fire’ has been the death of small unit tactics in modern armies. Use the weapons and training that you have, and FIGHT.
9) Those asking for battle inoculation sounds of incoming fire will find some in this video. Zip/crack etc.
American trained
Who trains FARC?
Darwin trains everyone.
As I pondered this video, while splitting wood, it occurred to me that one of the flip sides of the lack of aggression/lack of firing was the palpable denial.
None of them acted like they were in a serious tactical cluster. They did not fight, they hardly fired their weapons. The use of the machine gun, a crew served weapon, is classic SLAM.
They talked on their radios and relied on air support and the promise of heli-borne reinforcements. It gave them comfort.
Both spoken and observable was a refusal to move under enemy fire, and no effort made to suppress the enemy in order to allow such movement. They were fixed in place by their own actions, by allowing the enemy to make it so.
With dynamic leadership and aggressive well trained troops they could have violently fought their way out of the situation. Air support would then have only been used to help interdict enemy follow up and aid the break contact/withdrawal in contact.
Your point of lack of aggressiveness says it all to me.
Whatever their shortcomings in other infantry tactics, this is what did them in overall. The attitude was “we’ll just stay put until the grown ups arrive and take charge”. Excellent example of -what not to do-.
Side note: Maybe my perception was wrong, but I was struck at the almost non-existent gear many of them seem to have on their person. The one guy escorting the journalist looked to have only a single canteen. Couldn’t determine his ammo load out. Was this a stroll in the jungle?
What does “SLAM” mean?
SLA Marshall: studies into rates of shooting in combat. Taken up more recently by Grossman of the “sheepdog” concept.
Lack of authority on the subordinates part is also clear. No initiative. It’s beat OUT of them instead of INTO them. I lived in PR for many years and saw it daily. How may times did you hear them call back to the Captain? Only el Jefe makes the call.
First of all, pointing fingers at who trained them serves no purpose here. There were obvious failures, at many levels. Why don’t we key in on that.
First of all, I question the planning of this op. They achieved tactical surprise at the first site; why did they then go to a second site? Yes, in hindsight, easy to see that the G’s are now alerted and maneuvering on you. Was this not anticipated from previous ops?
No tactical flexibility. They flew over occupied sites, noticed them, but yet chose(?) to continue on to the 2d briefed objective, which turns out to be a “dry hole” (or deliberate ambush?).
Lack of leadership. This captain had good intentions, but no tactical savvy. As Max previously commented, he made very little attempt to maneuver aggressively on the enemy. His time was spent reporting to higher ups and requesting support. He seemed paralyzed when it came to effectively deploying his sub-units. This may have been in part due to the fear of mines.
There was no cohesive chain of command with aggressive sub-unit leaders. It seems the Capt was running everything from his level instead of letting sub-unit leaders run their own sticks.
Overall, poor unit tactical training was the root cause of this failure. Kinda scarry, all the stuff Max is always banging on is clearly illustrated here. These guys take fire, and become essentially fixed in place. They do not determine if it’s effective fire, they just stay in place. The reliance is on higher ups providing aerial covering fire, and reinforcements, not controlling your own destiny.
I just want to add, these guys did not lack in courage; South Americans are brave and tough hombres. What they lacked was the independent thought and action as a maneuver element.
So, in the end, they stay in place, and are over-run. Amazingly, right under the noses of circling air assets. Hmmm. Just cuz you can see what’s going on, doesn’t necessarily mean you can affect what’s going on.
Wow, so much to learn here. American-style military power is kinda like a McDonalds. When it’s working well, it’s amazing, if not tasty. When it breaks down, it’s a hot mess. Well, actually a cold one, but you get my point.
In closing, I think we need to keep context in mind here. Easy to point out the failure on the ground, without analyzing the circumstances. The politics of US support to Columbia. The amount of actual control US advisors have over the training and employment of these units. The Columbian chain of command and their guidance on the same. The Columbia government and their actual buy-in to the ops. So to criticize this op, in a vacuum, based solely on this journalist’s footage, doesn’t tell the whole story. Anyone with real experience active duty knows this.
This reminds me of my buddy training ANP, who said the powers that be are going through the motions of making it look like they’re doing something, when in reality, it’s all just a dog and pony show to keep the aid flowing. I think these guys were just brave victims of the same bullshit.
“Who trains them” yeah kind of important, not as important as the strategic planning that sends basically well armed cops out to execute a search warrant type operation.
But think of the intel you can garner by watching this video, the whole tactical repertoire right in front of you if you watch closely.
If I were their opponents I would pray to god their radio batteries never die, hell they might fight then.
But then again, who trains them is totally irrelevant if there is no real buy-in from the powers that be. You could have your SAS do a MTT here and wouldn’t see a different outcome. This game is rigged.
I was thinking much the same thing. Looked more like beat cops calling for the SWAT team.
They did have a shit-load of comms, but nobody was coordinating any maneuver with them.
The thought occurred to me that the oppo was just trying to draw fire and get them to dump their basic loads before moving in for the kill. Lots of long range sniping to draw fire, pinpoint positions, and run them out of ammo.
Also, noticed these guys were seriously overloaded with shit. Easy to carry lots of crap when the heli drops you off on the “X”. Not so easy to maneuver with.
Safety lies forward. Nowadays everyone wants to take cover and wait instead of run over the top of the enemy and stomp on his face.
Good analysis Max.
Thanks for the input on the sounds of incoming fire.
It’s interesting to see how the reliance on air power trickles down to small unit tactics.
The jungle also provides great concealment which mitigates the air power advantage.
Good food for thought.
Every time some shitbird starts in about how you can’t fight a regime with FLIR-equipped attack choppers, and all the other hi-tech, this vid should pop up.
Sobering.
To me this incident highlights two lessons:
1. Movement is life. A moving target is a lot harder to hit than a stationary target. Get off the X and move.
2. There is trained and untrained. In stress, you revert to the level of training you have actually mastered. Get high-quality training and master it.
Damn…
that was hard to watch. Not the combat, but watching those guys sit there and wait to be overrun is sickening.
I don’t know how big of a force they were facing, but they opfor had to be stretched thin if they were closing in from all sides. A good push, shooting and moving, might have gotten those guys home safe to their families. Sad.
Having watched that vid several times I noted that those government troops had very light ammo pouches and seemed to carry everything in them BUT ammo. I know that in Columbia the military is the historic root of most revolution and the Government has always been reluctant to hand more than a few rounds at a time to the ranks. The video seemed like more of a PR stunt gone wrong than a planned combat OP. They had lots of “shinny new” gear and transport up until contact, then all they got was a UH-1 “Charlie Charlie” bird and a 70 year old AC-47 “PUFF” gunship. I never heard the M-60D in the door of that UH-60A once after contact , Just the miniguns and the “thump-Thump” gun on PUFF and the squad 240’s. The only guy that seemed to have a clue was the guy in black with the FNC and he hit the exit when it all went T-U. For Shure SOMBODY had intercourse with the canine on that OP . But the way the Capt. was bitching about ammo I have to wonder if the pooch screw didn’t start MUCH higher up that food chain.
I feel like they should have at least returned fire at some point. an enemy will gain confidence if they are allowed to advance unopposed.Im not trying to be a keyboard warrior but come on, at least shoot back.