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Operation Red Wings

“It’s not the critic that counts, but the man in the ring with the blood on his face.”

Several people have emailed me the link to an article in the Captains Journal and asked me to comment. The article is titled: ‘A Marine Corps View Of Tactics In Operation Red Wings‘ and is actually pretty interesting. One commenter told me: “Sounds like you discussing ‘Lone Survivor.’ The critique here is spot on, I believe.  Sounds strikingly familiar, like one of your lectures/posts.”

My intent here is to comment on some of the issues raised in the article, and not armchair quarterback what the SEALs did on that mountain. I wasn’t there, but given that, there are areas in which comment may be constructive. I have also not yet seen the movie ‘Lone Survivor’ although I want to and will so so at some point. But hey, its  a movie anyway, so it doesn’t matter, right?

So, the first thing you need to do is read the Captains Journal article. HERE.

Here is the part of the article with Herschel’s son Daniel’s (USMC) comments, with my comments added in bold:

“This operation should never have come off the way it did.  The Marines don’t take chances.  I saw a room full of Navy SEALs sitting on their assess back at the FOB doing nothing but monitoring comms.  If you set four SEALs down by helicopter, you could have set an entire platoon down.  There was no reason to limit the recon team to four.” No. I will add some detail below on the context of the mission. However a four man team, covert, is fine as a recce team. Setting a platoon down defeats the object of a covert recce team. What is important here is a good plan to get them out if they are compromised. 

“I was on a recon mission in Fallujah, and we had an entire platoon.  We were monitoring a mosque for anti-American messaging, and we were beside a building (abandoned school) that AQ was using to execute leaders of Fallujah.  We were watching the mosque and someone came over comms and said, “Um guys, there are dudes with masks on that just got out of cars with some other dude who had a hood on.”  We started watching them, and sure enough, they were AQ getting reading to execute another elder.  We laid waste to them because we had a platoon, not a four man fire team.  Even when doing recon, we have enough men.  We escorted snipers to their two- or three-day post, and then escorted them back.  We didn’t want our Scout Snipers getting killed on the way to or from their post.” There is a tactical misunderstanding here between the objective of a recon or sniper mission, and the use of security/QRF teams to provide protection to the recce/sniper team.   A platoon is fighting patrol, a four man team is a recce patrol. 

“Alternatively, since you knew comms was going to be bad on the other side of that mountain, you could have set down another team of four SEALs on top of the mountain or near it, who could have then relayed comms to the FOB from the recon team.  We did stuff like that all the time.  There was no excuse to have sent a team of four.  And there was no excuse to have poor comms when you knew you were going to have poor comms.” Again, it is not in the use of a team of four (what’s with the hatred of teams of four?), this comment is more a criticism  of the specific operational planning and the lack of use of a comms rebroadcast/relay team. However, going big early is not always the answer.

“Another example showing that they didn’t think ahead and plan for the worst is …” (and at that point I interjected, “Why wasn’t anyone carrying …”) a SAW (Daniel said)?  ‘Yes’, I responded.  “The fact that they had suppressed, scoped weapons shows that they were not prepared to lay down suppressive fire.  They hadn’t planned for the worst.  Marines plan for the worst.”  Marines are better than SEALs then? Pissing contest anyone? Anyway, moving on: the team were on a covert recce mission. Sure, it’s a matter of tactical opinion if they could have carried a SAW for use in a cover group. Now we are armchair quarterbacking them. They were at 9000 feet, maybe they felt a SAW was heavy to carry for a covert mission at that altitude?

“Furthermore, they were laying around when the goat herders stumbled up.  If it had been my fire team, I would have said “never stop moving, but if you do, then we’re going to dig in and act like we’re going to defend this terrain to the death.”  We would have dug in in such a manner that we had interlocking fields of fire, all built around a SAW where we could have done fire and maneuver.” Can’t comment – was that in the movie?

“Next, about that conversation they had concerning the goat herders.  I would have ended it in a hurry.  I would have popped both goat herders and then popped all of the goats.  They could charge me later, but in the mean time the operation was compromised and it was time to leave.”  (Editorial note: Comments at this article dream up scenarios where they could have taken the “prisoners” with them and avoided all of the problems.  It’s all a day dream.  Attempting to take the goat herders to the top of the mountain would have slowed them and left them in the same situation, as well as told the goat herders that they were unwilling to shoot them, at which point the goat herders would have done the same thing, run down the mountain and tell the Taliban commanders). Never! It is not the job of a soldier to murder non combatants. What is this crazy talk? Mission compromised, extract. Have an extraction plan just for this is contingency. If they didn’t. that was their planning mistake. All I will say, is if this was time sensitive, like the assault helicopters were on the way and Gus Goatherder popped up, then take him into custody until the mission goes in, then release him. 

He said that they badly underestimated the capabilities of the Afghan fighters.  Those folks were born there, and their lungs are acclimated to the thin air.  Given the weight of the kit they were hauling, it was foolish to think that they could have beaten indigenous men up to the top of the mountain when those men were wearing thin man-dresses and carrying nothing but an AK-47 and a couple of magazines. Can’t comment, haven’t seen the movie yet – was this at the point when the team were trying to E&E? Is it foolish to try to beat the guy to the top of the mountain when to do so will mean you will live? They were in the situation they were in (“it is what it is”), they were trying to survive. If there is fault here, it goes back to the contingency planning on their extraction – but their evacuation ARF chopper was shot down right? That wasn’t in the plan. Shit happens. 

I asked Daniel what the worst case was if an entire platoon of SEALs would have deployed instead of the four man recon team and the Taliban commander wasn’t in the village, and he said “So what?  Take some MREs with you, go into the village, drink chai with the elders, win a little hearts and minds, and get some intel.  Do counterinsurgency, something the SEALs think they’re too good to do.” That wasn’t the mission., The mission was to take out Ahmed Shah. Not accomplished by drinking chai in the village. (Did I mention that Marines were running this mission? More below).

As for the loss of the QRF, Daniel was just livid.  The notion that the QRF lost its CAS to other missions or emergent problems is simply ridiculous.  Losing the Apache helicopters meant exactly one thing.  They lost the QRF.  Period.  If they weren’t dedicated resources, then they never really had a QRF to begin with.  And there was no reason that the C-130s shouldn’t have been refueled and circling above-head the entire time.  They dropped the four man team out there without the right support, without the right weapons (no area suppression weapon), without good comms, and finally, without applying classical infantry tactics. This is the interesting bit, that I will talk about below.

“I’ve seen it before.  The CO didn’t want to hear about problems because they’re all playing the ‘my dick is bigger than your dick’ game.  They sent a SEAL team to do what they should have sent classical infantry to do.  They should have sent in a Marine Corps infantry platoon, or if you want to go all spec ops, send in Marine Force Recon. Ditto, below.

“Or if you don’t want it to be a Marine Corps operation, send in the Rangers.  I understand that SEALs are pretty bad ass.  If you have complex HALO jumps and frogman operations, or hostage rescue, they are the guys to call.  But they don’t do classic infantry fire and maneuver, and that’s what was needed that day.  The Rangers are pretty bad ass too.  Send them in.  They know how to do fire and maneuver, set up interlocking fields of fire, develop enfilade fire, and so on.” This is the sweet spot. More below.

“I patrolled with SEALs once in Fallujah when they were looking for a HVT.  They have this attitude that ‘We’re SEALs.  We don’t need anyone or anything else.’  But that day they did.  They needed infantry, and command should have sent in enough men to prepare for the worst.  They took chances, and good men died as a result.” Ditto, below.

HERE is the Wikipedia article on Operation Red Wings. Below are some background quotes:

The 3rd Battalion of the 3rd Marine Regiment (3/3), which deployed to Regional Command (East) (RC(E)) (which included the Kunar Province) in late 2004 to conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, identified a number of operational barriers due to Special Operations Command doctrine for the battalion’s counterinsurgency work in the area. These barriers included non-sharing of intelligence with the battalion and non-disclosure of impending raids by special operations units in the area. To mitigate these problems, 3/3’s staff developed an operational model which integrated special operations forces units into their operations, allowing the sharing of intelligence between the battalion and special operations forces as well as maintaining solid operational control of operations with integrated special operations assets and units by the battalion. Operations that 3/3 conducted based on this model proved successful in disrupting ACM activity. The first of these, Operation Spurs (named after the San Antonio Spurs basketball team), conducted in February 2005, took place in the Korangal Valley, in the Kunar Province’s Pech District. Spurs utilized Navy SEALs for the opening two phases of this five phase operation. Similar operations that followed included Operation Mavericks (named after the Dallas Mavericks basketball team), in April, 2005, and Operation Celtics (named after the Boston Celtics basketball team) in May 2005.[16] These operations, all of which included Navy SEALs, were conceived and planned by the battalion, with the specifics of those phases involving Navy SEALs being planned by the SEALs. Each operation lasted between three and four weeks.  3/3 planned and executed approximately one of these operations per month, maintaining a consistent operational tempo. The culmination of 3/3’s efforts was the April, 2005 forced surrender of a regional (and national) “high value” target, an ACM commander known as Najmudeen, who based his operations out of the Korangal Valley. With the surrender of Najmudeen, ACM activity in the region dropped significantly. Najmudeen’s surrender, however, left a power vacuum in the region.

3/3 tracked a number of known ACM groups they determined to be possibly seeking to fill the power void in the region. The battalion began planning a new operation, tentatively called Operation Stars (which was named after the Dallas Stars professional hockey team (3/3’s battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Norman Cooling, hailed from Texas, hence most operations being named after Texas sports teams)). Stars, like the other operations before it, focused on disrupting ACM activity, although due to Najmudeen’s surrender, this activity had dropped and specific groups proved difficult to pinpoint.In May 2005, the Advanced Party of 3/3’s sister battalion, the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Marine Regiment (2/3) arrived in RC(E). Since before deploying to Afghanistan, 2/3’s intelligence officer, Captain Scott Westerfield and his assistants, had been tracking a small cell led by a man named Ahmad Shah, based on intelligence sent back by 3/3’s intelligence officer. Shah was from a remote region in Nangarhar Province, which borders the Kunar Province. Shah, they determined, was responsible for approximately 11 incidents against coalition forces and Government of Afghanistan entities, including small arms ambushes and improvised explosive device attacks. By June, 2005, 2/3 had relieved-in-place 3/3, and had taken the Stars concept and developed a comprehensive operation, an operation they called Operation Red Wings, with the goal of disrupting Anti-Coalition Militia Activity, with an emphasis on disrupting Ahmad Shah’s activities, which were based near the summit of Sawtalo Sar.

Further intelligence, including human intelligence and signals intelligence indicated that Shah based his insurgent / terrorist operations out of some small structures outside of the village of Chichal, high on the slopes of Sawtalo Sar mountain in the upper Korangal Valley, approximately 20 miles to the west of Kunar’s provincial capital, Asadabad. Using imagery Intelligence, taken from a UAV on June 17, 2005, Westerfield identified likely structures used for housing his team, IED making, and overwatch of the area below, for IED strikes. The intelligence staff identified four Named Areas of Interest, or NAIs containing specific structures in which Shah might be using. These Named Areas of Interest and specific buildings were determined by analyzing and processing a number of instances of a variety of intelligence, including signals intelligence, human Intelligence, and imagery Intelligence. Westerfield and his staff determined that Shah and his men had been responsible for approximately 11 incidents against American, Coalition, and Government of Afghanistan entities, including IED strikes and small arms ambushes. They determined that Shah and his men would be occupying the area of Chichal in late June, a time of low lunar illumination. The operation would require a helicopter insert of forces to cordon the area and search for Shah and his men, and they sought to conduct this operation at night, after positive identification of Shah by a Marine Corps Scout / Sniper team, which would walk into the area under cover of darkness some nights before.

As with 3/3 before them, 2/3 sought to use Special Operations Forces assets for Red Wings, but unlike 3/3, they sought only the use of Special Operations Aviation assets, specifically, MH-47 Special Operations Aircraft of the Army Special Operations Command’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (SOAR(A)), and not ground forces. The command from which 2/3’s planners requested this, however, CJSOTF-A, or Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan, refused this request, stating that in order for Red Wings to be supported with Special Operations aviation, the battalion would have to task the opening phases of the operation to Special Operations Ground Forces for the opening phases of the operation, with Marines of 2/3 acting in a supporting role. After the initial phases of Red Wings, then 2/3 could be considered the lead, supported element. The battalion agreed to this, realizing, however, that this unconventional command structure defied a fundamental tenet of successful military operations – “unity of command“.The operation was presented to a number of Special Operations units working in the area for possible “buy in.” U.S. Navy SEALs from SEAL Team 10 and SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 1 expressed interest.

Insert, compromise, and ambush of SEAL reconnaissance and surveillance team:

Late in the night of June 27, 2005, two MH-47 Special Operations Aircraft of the Army Special Operations Command’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (SOAR(A)) approached Sawtalo Sar. As one of the aircraft performed a number of “decoy drops” to confuse any possible enemy on the ground as to the specific purpose of helicopters, the other inserted, via fastrope, a four-man Navy SEAL reconnaissance and surveillance team in a saddle between Sawtalo Sar and Gatigal Sar, a peak just to the south of Sawtalo Sar. The insert point was roughly one and one half miles from the nearest Named Area of Interest. The team members were team leader Navy Lieutenant Michael P. Murphy of SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 1 (SDVT-1), based out of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; Petty Officer Second Class Danny P. Dietz from SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 2 (SDVT-2), based out of Virginia Beach, Virginia; Petty Officer Second Class Matthew G. Axelson from SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 1 (SDVT-1); and Navy Hospital Corpsman Second Class Marcus Luttrell, of SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 1 (SDVT-1). After moving to a pre-determined, covered overwatch position, from which the SEALs could observe the Named Areas of Interest, the team was discovered by local goatherds. After determining that they were civilians, and not combatants, Lieutenant Murphy had them released, according to rules of engagement.

The team, surmising that they would likely be compromised, retreated to a fallback position. Within an hour, the SEAL Reconnaissance and Surveillance team was ambushed by Shah and his men. The SEALs were attacked by RPK light machine guns, AK-47s, RPG-7 Rocket Propelled Grenades, and 82mm mortars. The intensity of the incoming fire, combined with the type of ambush forced the SEAL team into the northeast gulch of Sawtalo Sar, on the Shuryek Valley side of Sawtalo Sar. The SEALs made a number of attempts to contact their combat operations center with a multi-band radio and then with a satellite phone. The team could not establish consistent communication, other than for a period long enough to indicate that they were under attack. Three of the four team members were killed, and the only survivor, Marcus Luttrell, was left unconscious with a number of fractures and other serious wounds. He regained consciousness and was rescued by local Pashtun, who ultimately saved his life, as in his condition, without assistance, he would surely have been killed or captured by the Taliban.

——————————-

So, to step back from the specifics of the operation for a moment, we see a theme here, something that I have long noticed. You see a dynamic here with the Marines supporting the SEALs in the same way that the Rangers support CAG. But the higher tier units, in this case the SEALs, are calling the shots and playing with all the toys.

There is a reason for special units – it is to select and train people to be very good at specific tasks. These units always tend to evolve their roles. For example, the SAS moving into the counter-terrorism (“black kit”) role and developing it. Navy SEALs moving on from the frogman and underwater demolition role to being very good at dynamic entry/hostage rescue. The thing about special units is that they select and attract a high caliber of individual who then receive a lot of training and can be trained in turn to a high level. There is also an aspect here that involves the politicians who are running the show. We perhaps have an operation that involves actual and political risk. Ok, send in the ‘toppest’ tier super unit you can find. What, the Rangers would do a better job? That’s not the point. Its making politicians happy. This in turn puts all the assets towards the top tier units and allows them to run the show. Political risk aversion.

But really, you should be using the best units for the job. I can’t tell you if the Navy SEAL team did a better or worse job than the scout sniper team that was originally tasked with the recce. Maybe the Marine scout sniper team, having walked in, would not have been compromised? A little more humility and a little less high tech goes a long way. I am reminded of the “super secret hiding positions” used in ‘Team America’!

It’s not about how ‘high speed’ or top tier a unit may be. A lot of it comes down to groupie stuff and the units being untouchable. Lets looks at the CAG/Ranger dynamic. If I wanted a hostage rescued from a building, with perimeter security, then send in CAG with the Rangers on the perimeter.  The Rangers themselves are ‘Special Operations Forces’ and are infantry at a high level. Therefore, if I wanted a company attack or raid, with supporting assets, to go in on an enemy location, I want the Rangers to do it. High level infantry stuff. But high level because it is basics trained at a high level, carried out by fit and motivated soldiers, not because there is anything super secret about what they do.

If it is true that the SEALs lacked basic infantry skills, then that is a big no no. It doesn’t matter what unit you come from, if you are on the ground playing soldiers, you need to have your small unit tactics squared away. This is not ‘special’ anything. It is good solid basics conducted by highly fit and motivated individuals. That is why it is ‘special’. nothing more. This is why you get this disdain by individuals such as Herschel’s son, a Marine, who knows his infantry work. His disdain is for those who think they are too good, who are trying to ‘specops’ their way through, without realizing that what it may take is another box of SAW ammo, and some good solid infantry work.

And of course, this ‘specops’ mentality pervades into the civilian training world,  the tacticool world, and the point is missed by the fanboys.

Good special forces are good not only because they get good at whatever their actual specialism is, but because when they do the more standard infantry work, they do it to a very high level. They may plan a recce patrol, and plan it well, checking equipment, rehearsing, planning and executing with a high level of motivation and attention to detail. It is about quiet professionalism and hard graft, not being super cool. There is no reason that you should be any different in your training.

Whatever the standard of the infantry skills of those four SEALs, and I can’t comment on what it may have been, they were out there, and they fought as best they could. That cannot be criticized. What perhaps can, is the organizational environment that led to them doing what they were doing with the support that they had, or didn’t have.

One thing is for sure, three of them are feasting in Valhalla, brave men all.

Live hard.

Die Free.

Max

Till Valhalla!

 

 

33 responses to “Operation Red Wings”

  1. Even though I have not directly seen these specific issues I found them easy to infer just based on the organizational relationships I have observed and experienced elsewhere.

  2. Read the book. Not 2nd guessing them,however once compromised they should have bugged out NOT contemplated completing the mission…why? because “NEVER QUIT” did their training confuse bugging out from a compromised mission with their severe training/endurance in the face of physical hardship??

    It is mind bogging that communications were not insured with a c-130/drone another team to relay comms and possibly being in the area for support if needed.

    Previously a navy seal died while attempting to cross a river in flood stage. Foolish or necessary to complete a mission? A valuable resource wasted.

    It has been said after all the spec/ops training that members endure, that Irag and especially Afghanistan are spec/ops Olympics not only for American forces but for every nation sending spec/ops troops there.

    Is there an element of being braver more daring more capable of enduring hardship to ensure a reputation??

    The 1st Special Service Brigade had a similar problem . Their men would hurl themselves into trenches and unsupported assaults because…they were superbly trained and had a never quit I shall overcome attitude and it was commented that in essence those that did that threw their lives away when an obvious tactic or waiting momentarily for support would have accomplished the objective without contributing their life.

  3. What needs to be remembered as well was the active role the target was playing in a number of AQ ambushes and raids. This motivates to push the envelope. If they thought they could take out Shah and save fellow soldiers, they were willing to stick their necks out farther to do so. IMO, the risk/reward paradigm pushed them forward more than the “my dick is bigger than yours” issue. These guys were a unit tasked with taking out a really bad guy. They don’t like to fail if it means more soldiers are killed. When asked why they put themselves into a dangerous situation to save someone else, a hero will most often say: “What else could I do?” It (the need to help and make a difference) is just there. There is no other option.

  4. Small Special Forces teams, compromised goat herder, refusal to “slot” said goat herder, E+E etc.

    Sounds like Bravo Two Zero in Iraq 1991 to a degree.

    Be interested to rad Max’s comparisons between the two, if indeed there is any legitimate comparisons.

    • Regarding Jay’s comments.

      Pushing the envelope facing a group of 80+ knowing that there was little cover for a 4 man recce team tasked with eliminating the leader of the bad guys. If you can’t hide to observe, to get in place for your ambush and before that happens you are discovered by goat herders… You left behind your m-60 account of weight and terrain you would be on,no sustained communications,limited firepower in your team if caught or pursued or involved in a firefight and no immediate support available on the ground..

      4 brave men 3 gone one retired early from injury/wounds and the main bad guy still there..

      Too loaded down with equipment/supplies to move effectively..dropped into an environment knowing there was no cover, and found by herders..might have been better to be dropped in with a man dress on 3 mags per man limited food/water and having a platoon of rangers nearby..there only real chance was to not be discovered.

      In the repeated falls down the mountain most equipment/packs were torn off and lost..

    • Actually, Beck would do better to have this guy read his review, rather than the woman’s, to Mr. Luttrell:

      “The movie attempts to pull the heartstrings of patriotic Americans; you know, the folks who get misty at the thought of continuing the War on the World the US has been waging since 1893 to “protect our freedoms”. It pushes all the right emotive buttons but one has to step back and change the framework. Consider this thought experiment alluded to earlier with Red Dawn: it is not Afghanistan but the American hinterland in 2015 with Federal forces battling confederation guerrillas in seceded states resisting the attempts of the central government to reestablish its stranglehold over the states. The point of view would remain the same of a group of US SEALs working to assassinate a local rebel leader in the states who is insisting on sovereignty and a divorce from the central planners in DC. A skilled director and screenwriter would achieve this in the same fashion Lone Survivor manipulated the audience by portraying all the bad guys as evil and not simply armed locals sick to death of central planners in a faraway capital, Kabul, forcing them to comply with alien cultures and morals imported from the West.”

      http://zerogov.com/?p=3173

  6. I wrote this days ago. I read the book and went WTF. Basically the Tali had patrols out and they were above the SEALs already or near enough (as if no one can figure out what a helo insert sounds like). In the book when the herders were let loose they went uphill, now they might have cut back and went down, but it was uphill last the SEALs saw.

    Can’t second guess them after the herders, but I might have tied them together to slow them down and then I thought maybe side hilling for speed while making recons for comms.

    If they would have been inserted with comms repeater capability and a laser target designator and a committed QRF not an adhoc outfit with no unified command (basically means fitness reports are on the line)then it seems not so half assed.

  7. Even worse was the ad hoc rescue attempt in a chinook in daylight, an already enemy that outnumbers you on their home turf and then the loss of the chinook and all those magnificent men..

    So who won? and would prudence made for a less catastrophic outcome?

    Hard to even measure the worth of a Navy Seal, that loss shall be remembered.

  8. We need to separate some things and look at the pieces. We have focused on the actions of a four man team led by a LT JG who performed heroically on the battlefield. What mission prep did they take and what did their leaders do to ensure the success of the mission?

    The four man recce element. All were SEALS and experienced operators. They were assigned a mission that was within their skill set and a mission that they trained for and conducted in the past. Their four man team were familiar with each other and had worked as unit for long enough that they were comfortable as a team.

    What actions did they take to prepare for this mission? The unit has SOPs for mission planning, equipment ID’d for the mission, rehearsals, etc. Who in their chain of command was back briefed on the plan and who observed and approved their preparation? What guidance did they receive for the mission and who ensured that guidance was incorporated into their plan?

    Comms was an issue. SEAL teams have access to top end equipment of all types. The team had comms equipment and a satphone. Operations were ongoing in that AOR and previous units had worked in that area. Who approved the comms plan and comms package for this mission? Are we to believe that a LT JG was solely responsible for selection of the comms package and no one in the chain of command reviewed this selection?

    Intel was good to very good on the location of the HVT, movement patterns were known well enough to develop a reasonable probability that the HVT would be in the NAI at the time of the patrol. Knowing the size of the entourage with the HVT, what instructions were given to the patrol about contact, compromise, extraction, and reporting?

    Based on what I read in the book and elsewhere, it appears as if LT Murphy was given limited planning guidance for this mission. Was his a limited reconnaissance patrol? It appears that there was a lack of detailed planning and corresponding rehearsal for this mission, or, that the planning was inappropriate to the mission.

    The knowledge set and experience of an LT JG , even though he was a SEAL, was not broad enough to cover the risk associated with this mission.

    I believe those four men did everything they knew how to do to complete the mission. It appears to me that their mission was poorly thought out and planned by their senior leadership. Ultimately, they were thrown to wolves because of acts of commission or omission by leaders who should have been proactively involved in the planning and oversight of the execution the recon mission.

    This needs more development but I am limited by my device.

  9. First, the SEALs must graduate Ranger and Airborne school before they join a platoon. The snipers are well trained. I would guess that some of the author’s point is valid in that they do not operate as conventional infantry very often. They are normally carrying a lot less ammo than most of us would feel comfortable with. Before deployment these guys work their asses off to get ready.

    It is not unusual to insert a team by helo some distance away to maintain surprise and infil to the target area on foot for miles. They study and use terrain to avoid ambush and discovery. Sometimes shit happens.

    I have been told that there are notable discrepancies between the book/movie and the actual after-action report. Nothing wrong with speculating on some things to glean some insight though.

    There are differences between Teams and not all have the same style. I wouldn’t stereotype the entire community.

    I once asked a friend about the point that some of the missions he was getting seemed a bit “over-clubbed” using his team. He said “we’re the easy button.” Less risk for the commander and fast response time.

    When we cross the LD one day, anybody think that in the early days you’re gonna have a whole platoon?? Know the enemy will attempt to find, fix, finish. Prevent it. Be prepared to run to escape the net. If you can’t do that now, better figure out how and soon.

    • D Are you certain of that? I think SEALS attending Ranger School is more an exception rather than a rule and it is not a requirement.

      From the Rangers I know I heard the washout rate for SEALS in Ranger School is quite high.

  10. Don’t wanna keep beating this horse, but in the comments at the link one of them mention that as a response to this cluster a senior enlisted man is required for all planning so as to temper some of the perceptions that SEAL PR instills in them versus reality.

    Good idea, they, IMO worth two Zim cents is that this SEAL team violated the three legged stool of shoot, move, communicate with a chainsaw.

    What does this have to do with us in a WROL/SHTF? Well if some “commander” starts to rail on planning a raid that sounds like Big .Mil I’m going to find the exit door.

    • Issues with this: “Well if some “commander” starts to rail on planning a raid that sounds like Big .Mil I’m going to find the exit door.”

      What do you mean by this? Are you broad brush equating “Big .mil” with incompetence? There is no reason why competent commanders with well trained fighters cannot plan significant raids, based on sound tactical planning and principles. That is nothing to do with ‘specops’ – its more to do with Ranger style infantry work. In Patriot Dawn, there is a specific example of a company sized raid. I put it in there to illustrate the point.

      However, this does bring to mind a comment from Mosby’s recent ‘Horde 3’ post where he joked about a bunch of ‘rugged individuals’ trying to fly in formation for a time. This doesn’t mean you shouldn’t bail if some jumped up “commander” starts to plan something incompetent and tries to lead you to your death. But if done with competence, these military tactics work. And there needs to be more service to ‘team’ than to individual for team tactics to work.

      Rugged individuals will die as individuals. Teams will achieve more success.

      • I try and be brief, this means I leave out what should be familiar and it causes confusion, for this I am sorry.

        You wrote it yourself I do believe, as in a SHTF situation planning big raids is not going to be the first thing on the board, it takes time to build an outfit. SEALS are decades old and they’re still unfucking themselves. Two days after the event if someone elects themselves general and plans an attack on Mordor I am probably gonna go home to my family.

        As for Big.Mil yes I have a jaundiced view of it. Its me, I question authority, its what I do I am a bad person.

    • I’m not sure how you can shortcut the planning cycle and expect a high success rate. If FREEFOR ever is fortunate enough to be able to plan and execute a company sized operation or above, how would you differ from the big .MIL play book?

      Every major operation I’ve ever been involved with enjoyed participation by senior enlisted. This is even more true of a SEAL det that regularly deploys with very experienced enlisted, up to E9. In those particular units, rank distinction is minimized.

      • I’m confused? Are you agreeing with my comment or disagreeing? If the former, where did I talk about short cutting a planning process? Please clarify?
        I’ve been a little discombobulated in general by the comments on this post. Perhaps that means that the post itself lacked any real utility?

        • Not at all. Notice the indent? I was commenting on RRS’ comment. I agree with you Max. Sorry if I wasn’t making my point clearly. It all makes more sense with an extra finger of Jameson. You took a real world story and use it as a teaching point. I see a bunch of utility in that. See also, “Light Infantry Tactics” by Larsen. He does a great job using real world incidents to illustrate tactical points. Happy hunting this weekend!

  11. I have read the Lone Survivor book and seen the movie, and read this article’s postings. With no disrespect to anyone intended, and trying to stay away from the could’a-should’a-would’a path, I offer several comments regarding some fundamentals of traditional ground tactical unit actions. My comments are based on my experiences as a US Army “leg” infantry battalion reconnaissance platoon leader in Germany in the early ‘70s, and subsequent traditional tactical unit experiences around the globe.

    (Background. My 44-man recon platoon’s missions included area and zone recon patrols; specific route recons including road/bridge/obstacle classifications; screening, economy of force/deception, and passage of lines operations; and combat patrols, including ambushes, raids, preparing & securing friendly force obstacles, breeching enemy obstacles; and providing security for far-forward arty FO teams. The majority of missions were conducted at the squad- and section-levels.)

    1. Establishing and maintaining communications between small-size / far-forward deployed elements and their designated operational controlling hqtrs ( — plat, company, or battalion hqtrs — ) is imperative. If terrain or distances require it, radio relay or retransmission stations must be planned for and established (or quickly established in response to a crisis requirement) by the platoon hqtrs or company/battalion comms elements) to operated 24/7. If a deployed unit cannot establish/maintain comms as required, then it is their responsibility to do so, even if it requires relocating. Failure for a deployed unit to establish and maintain comms in accordance with unit SOP or the specific operations order is a critical factor in ending or revising that unit’s mission.

    2. Small-size / far-forward deployed units must carry the weapons/firepower needed to both accomplish the assigned mission and to immediately react to enemy action so that it can either defeat the enemy upon contact, or break contact and then maneuver according to the situation. (Yes, the units should be calling for supporting arty and aerial fires based on pre-deployment planning, but that support might not be immediately available for a number of reasons.) Light machineguns — M60 — and grenade launchers — M79 then M203 — were the “force multipliers” available to my platoon, and were carried by even the smallest deployed units. (This required the soldiers to carry additional weapons and ammunition loads.)

    3. Unit SOPs ( — Bn, Co, and Plat SOPs — ) are the unit’s “playbooks” and cover most conceivable contingencies that deployed units may face and the corresponding action(s) the units should take, including actions regarding non-combatants. These SOP actions are developed over time, standardized, and the basic/”core” actions are constantly taught/reviewed at the company and platoon levels; and appropriate SOP actions are included in specific mission planning and rehearsal activities. During operations, unexpected situations will arise that will cause units to go into the “improvise-adapt-overcome mode”, but there should be no debate/discussion about basic/”core” SOP actions.

    4. If a tactical operation is constructed with the requirement for a dedicated contingency/ready-reaction force or other support ( — including the immediate response by a reinforcing unit with dedicated transportation assets, or the immediate execution of pre-planned aerial and/or indirect fires support provided by dedicated units — ) to be available immediately upon the deployed unit’s request, then the non-availability of any one of the dedicated assets would require a reassessment of the viability of the operation by the controlling hqtrs and chain of command, and a command decision made to end or revise the unit’s mission.

    Hopefully, my comments will provide some discussion regarding traditional ground tactical actions.

  12. The author’s son, Daniel, was a SAW gunner at Falluja. Look at pictures on the site under 26th MEU. So it is a former Lance Corporal, not the United States Marine Corps, telling us, “They dropped the four man team out there… without the right weapons (no area suppression weapon)…” From his frame of reference, an 0331, he believes what he said.

    Within the last year, Max, Mosby and AmericanMercenary wrote blog posts on suppressive fire. For example, AmMerc wrote:

    “Belt Fed Machineguns can provide suppressive fire to make them keep their heads down. You can’t carry enough ammo or reload fast enough to do the same with an M4gery (and if you can then you can’t do it accurately). If every time the bad guy sticks his head up you put a ding in his helmet that is every bit as effective “suppression” as you can achieve. Don’t waste bullets, but use them to achieve the effect you desire, which is keeping the bad guy pinned down until your buddy can move to a position to decisively end the fight.”

    Today, the Marine Corps has replaced worn-out SAWs in rifle platoons with the M27 IAR (each rifle company keeping nine SAWs in reserve.) With an IAR, the doctrine taught is less volume of fire is needed with much better accuracy. An M27 gunner with one aimed shot has the effect of a three- or four-round burst from the SAW, and still has the option of a heavier volume of fire if required by the tactical situation. Fewer rounds need to be used and automatic riflemen can remain in combat longer.

    “One hundred rounds do not constitute firepower. One hit constitutes firepower.” — Maj. Gen. Merritt A. Edson, USMC See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Edson%27s_Ridge

    • Most importantly, though, the selector creates a decision point for the user that never existed with the M249. This decision point must be trained to. Within a base of fire, the M27 should deliver a high volume of initial fire to help the fire team and squad establish fire superiority. This simple drill, called an RTR (return fire, take cover, return accurate fire) drill, should be drilled with the M27 and the M4. Once fire superiority is established, the M27 should be used primarily on semiautomatic to deliver highly accurate suppressive fire while helping to conserve ammunition for a more prolonged base of fire or for closing in a final assault. In training to this decision point, we must challenge our automatic riflemen with different battlefield stimuli and exposures. The decision point for the Marine on whether to transition from semiautomatic to full automatic should be tied to two things: first, the enemy exposure being presented to him, and second, his fires in relation to and support of a maneuver element closing on the enemy. Like the M4, the M27 can achieve suppressive effects with a single shot at a sustained rate of fire; however, if a squad is unsupported against stiff enemy resistance, semiautomatic fire alone will unlikely achieve the desired effects. A Marine’s training should reflect this reality. – See more at: http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/article/training-automatic-rifleman#sthash.dKYlVq03.dpuf

  13. Me thinks this article written by this jarhead is institutional bias to the max. Marines such as this guy have a personal hard-on against SEALS because they’re just squids and it’s offensive in their mindset to think any swabbie could do a better job than a jughead. Inter-service rivalry at it’s worse.

    SEALs have very good light infantry skill sets. They are perfectly capable of performing in that role. But what the fuck do you expect from 4 guys, configured for a SR mission, assaulted by a shit-load of assholes? It is irrelevant whether they were NSW, SF, Ranger, or 69th Royal Bicycle BN (Rein). Fucked is fucked.

    It does seem that there were some serious unity of command issues, as well as a serious shortage of air assets to support the SR effort, as well as other ground force operations, concurrently.

  15. There really are no words to fully describe the shit those men went through.The real crying shame is it now was for nothing.I wouldnt pay a nickel to see the movie,MarkyMark is vehemently anti-gun,like so many other hollywierdos who portray real life and fictional guntoting heroes.I suppose the only saving grace here is he plays a real hero.But then again,its only a movie.

  16. It wasn’t for nothing. Those men went to their god as warriors. The example they set under fire should inspire future generations of warriors. Despite the situation. Fuck the politics, and the higher ups, both civilian and mil-spec. Fuck the islo-fascist pricks. And especially fuck all the hypocritical pacifists, who pick up a rifle and play soldier for money, but then try and disarm you and me.

  17. Diz,
    Your comments are spot on. I served in 75th Rangers in Vietnam. Many times we were left hanging by “higher” when they pulled our dedicated gun ships. SEALS are very well trained. These men died well, did their duty and all are heroes. They should all be drinking Mead in Valhalla.
    If you put a large unit in their, the Taliban simply fade into the background and you accomplish nothing. Recon elements small hunter killer teams can move and adapt much quicker than small units.
    Great Post!

  18. I have trouble buying the narrative that the goat herders axtually compromised them, and that shooting them would have made any difference.

    If its true that they came under fire within an hour by 200+ men, then that would mean that the goat herders ran right to Shah, and he just happened to have that many guys standing around ready to roll out 24/7. Now if you think about for about 5 minutes, you should be able to come up with several logistical reasons alone why that makes zero sense. Plus a 4 man team is not what I’d send to handle a warlord and his 200 retainers, that’s a JDAM worthy target if there ever was one.

    The alternate scenario I’ve heard that actually seems plausible is that they were already compromised, and that a team of 8-10 men set up along their probable escape route. The goat herders were sent in to get the SEALS moving, and they just walked into a prepared ambush.

  19. This is a larger issue here that hasn’t been fully addressed. Should unarmed civilians who act as scouts and such be considered combatants and therefore subject to being killed, or do they get a pass, simply because the enemy is leveraging our ROE against us to the max? This seems to be a constantly repeating scenario, where fucking goat-herders roll up on SR teams, and a decision then needs to be made.

    On the one hand, teams such as bravo two zero and Spartan 1 decided to let them go. I seem to recall another SF team in Gulf War 1 that did the same thing.

    On the other hand. Paul Howe has written extensively of his experiences in the Battle of the Black Sea (aka “Blackhawk Down”). He describes clansmen who routinely used women and children as scouts, for weapons retrieval, and finally as human shields when cornered. He had absolutely no qualms about shooting through these people because in his mind, they were actively aiding the enemy, by pointing out where his guys were, and picking up weapons, instead of un-assing the AO when the shit went down.

    So where do you draw the line? What do you do with a tribe that cares nothing for it’s so-called un-armed civilians, and uses them to kill you, betting on the fact that you will hesitate to shoot them, based on your ROE?

    This is a prickly question in an unconventional warfare setting. We could very well be facing similar situations in the future.

  20. First, well I feel the author of “A Marine Corps View Of Tactics In Operation Red Wings” has as much right voice his opinion as anyone, what little I know of his credentials and what is demonstrated by his written word shows he doesn’t really have the background or maturity to be taken too seriously.

    I have done much work with USMC and have the utmost respect for their capabilities, they are great bunch to work with.

    I think Max’s comments are right on the money and will add only a few thoughts.

    My biggest concern is the comment about murdering non combatants, even if we ignore the morality of this issue (which I for one cannot!), you don’t gain trust and goodwill by murdering non combatants. With all the Tribalism discussion going on recently it should be abundantly clear that this causes far more problems than it solves.

    This “I will get home at any price mentality” is also a major problem with LEO’s.

    I don’t believe in winning or living at any price.

    Combat is dangerous. If the cost to do what is both just and right is too high a price to pay with ones life, then stay home!

    Most of my time in Afghanistan was spent as part of a 4 man team (imagine that!), even with great preparations and planning things go wrong.

    “Political risk aversion.” Yea it sucks, but it’s a fact of life. Again, don’t like it, stay home.

    The first half of a military career is far more idealistic than the last, which is far more cynical.

    The “Teams” have fine light infantry skills, I think it is more about the nature of SpecWar that you don’t hear about that small team that slips away after bloodying the nose of the Bad Guys that had superior numbers.

  21. Killing an unarmed civilian, and saying your ok with it, doesn’t make it ok, anymore than me telling you a red rose is blue, makes it blue. Great, he can convince himself that he did the right thing, good for him, people can convince themselves of all kinds of shit if they’re trying hard enough. Ask yourself this, If a man will justifying the killing of an unarmed person, out of a perceived need due to “extenuating circumstances”, what won’t he do when he feels “threatened” by ANYBODY, including you? People need to save their “kill ’em all, let God sort ’em out” mantra for Modern Warfare 3

  22. As a result of that op, Norm got his eagles and was assigned to Gnl. Toolins staff where they could keep and eye on him and keep him out of the field. Once on the Cstaff, Norm showed everyone his expertise at platoon and company level tactics, but not much else. He was a stone wall stuffing any and all good ops and good ideas for ops ever after, making sure that Gnl. Toolin never heard a productive word from his staff.